Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024)
Chapter: Front Matter
Consensus Study Report
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27159.
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COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING, COUNTERING, AND RESPONDING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM: CHEMICAL THREATS
TIMOTHY J. SHEPODD (Chair), Sandia National Laboratories (retired)
MARGARET E. KOSAL (Vice Chair), Georgia Institute of Technology
GARY A. ACKERMAN, University at Albany, State University of New York
PHILIPP C. BLEEK, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
GARY S. GROENEWOLD, Idaho National Laboratory (retired)
DAVID J. KAUFMAN, Center for Naval Analyses
KABRENA E. RODDA, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
NEERA TEWARI-SINGH, Michigan State University
GUY VALENTE, County of El Dorado, California (until January 2023)
USHA WRIGHT, SHARE Africa
Staff
LINDA NHON, Study Director
ALEX TEMPLE, Program Officer
MICAH LOWENTHAL, Director, CISAC
HOPE HARE, Administrative Assistant
MARIE KIRKEGAARD, Program Officer (until June 2022)
MEGAN HARRIES, Program Officer (until August 2022)
JESSICA WOLFMAN, Research Associate (until May 2023)
BOARD ON CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY
SCOTT COLLICK (Co-Chair), DuPont de Nemours Chemical and Plastics
JENNIFER SINCLAIR CURTIS (Co-Chair), University of California, Davis
GERARD BAILLELY, Proctor & Gamble Company
RUBEN G. CARBONELL, North Carolina State University
JOHN FORTNER, Yale University
KAREN I. GOLDBERG, University of Pennsylvania
JENNIFER M. HEEMSTRA, Emory University
JODIE LUTKENHAUS, Texas A&M University
SHELLEY D. MINTEER, University of Utah
AMY PRIETO, Colorado State University
MEGAN L. ROBERTSON, University of Houston
SALY ROMERO-TORRES, Thermo Fisher Scientific
REBECCA T. RUCK, Merck Research Laboratories
ANUP K. SINGH, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
VIJAY SWARUP, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company
Staff
CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director
LINDA NHON, Program Officer
LIANA VACCARI, Program Officer
MEGHAN HARRIES, Program Officer (until August 2022)
THANH NGUYEN, Financial Business Partner
JESSICA WOLFMAN, Research Associate (until May 2023)
AYANNA LYNCH, Research Assistant (until June 11, 2023)
BRENNA ALBIN, Senior Program Assistant
KAYANNA WYMBS, Program Assistant
Reviewers
This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by SUSAN KOCH, Department of State, National Security Council (retired), and MIRIAM E. JOHN (NAE), Sandia National Laboratories. They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
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Contents
Complex Chemical Threat Landscape
Assessing Strategies for Identifying Chemical Threats
Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical WMD
2.1 Complex Chemical Threat Landscape
2.2 Characterization of BROAD Chemical Threats
2.3 Delivery Methods of Chemical Agents
2.4 Emerging Chemical Threat Technologies
4 Adequacy of Strategies to Identify Chemical Threats
4.1 Analysis of Strategies to “Identify” WMDT Chemical Threats
4.2 “Identify” Strategy Efficacy
4.3 Implication of the National Strategic Shift from VEO to GPC from the Perspective of “Identify”
5 Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism
5.1 Analysis of Strategies to “Prevent or Counter” Chemical Terrorism Threats
6 Adequacy of Strategies to Respond to Chemical Terrorism
6.1 Analysis of Strategies for “Responding” to WMDT Chemical Threats
7.1 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategy
7.2 Department of Defense Strategy
7.3 Intelligence Community Strategy
7.5 Approaches to Identify, Prevent, Counter, and Respond with Broad Applicability
7.6 Threat-Agnostic Approaches to Medical Countermeasures Against Chemical Threats
A U.S. Government Strategies and Other Documents Considered
Preface
The strategies of the United States are exceptionally important as they influence policy, budgets, programs, and actions. Counterterrorism strategies against chemical terrorism have evolved and been supplemented since the days after 9/11/2001 as both threats and counterterrorism capabilities have evolved. Today, the United States has issued strategies that clearly prioritize great power competition (GPC) as the most important threat to world order. Terrorism has not disappeared, but it has been subordinated in prominence in U.S. national strategy. This committee was tasked with evaluating U.S. strategies against chemical terrorism during a time of overt shift in strategy to prioritize GPC over other threats. This change in national strategic priorities will result in new priorities, programs, and risks. How much national attention and resources should be given to chemical terrorism (and terrorism more broadly) as national priorities and as risk acceptance changes is a difficult question to answer. The committee took a high-level approach to this broad topic and included the advantages of various budget functions (see Table S-1).
Over the 16-month study period (January 2022–June 2023) our diverse committee met over a dozen times both in person and virtually. Regardless of the backdrop of dynamic national strategic priorities, the committee evaluated many national policy and strategy documents, some of which were issued during the course of this study group. (See Appendix Table A1 for a list of documents considered by the committee.) The committee also conducted multiple information-gathering sessions both at the National Academies and other agency locations (see Appendix Table A-2 for a list of organizations and individuals interviewed by the committee).
The committee created an evaluation rubric used to assess a subset of the National Strategies related to identifying, preventing, countering, and responding to potential chemical terrorism events (see Appendix D). A review of past, including thwarted, chemical terrorism events was conducted and any trends were analyzed. As the vast
majority of toxic chemical releases come from accidents, and chemical terrorism can result from a myriad of toxic chemicals used every day, the committee considered many factors that might enable or deter terrorism including the motivations of the terrorist. A great asset against chemical terrorism is the strong first responder communities throughout the United States and established policies for escalation of chemical events.
In addition to examining strategies and the assets that can support implementation, the committee also identified obstacles to implementing strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism. In particular, the failure of Congress to reauthorize the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program (6 CFR Part 27) legislation in July 2023 was noted by the committee at the time of expiration. CFATS is a coordinated federal program focusing on enhancing security measures at more than 40,000 domestic chemical facilities that help protect them from potential acts of terrorism, including insider threats and cyberattacks. CFATS reauthorization is supported by the chemical industry, the American Chemical Society, and this committee to ensure that chemical facilities operators are taking steps to reduce and mitigate the potential for terrorist exploitation of this vital critical infrastructure.
Finally, we want to give our sincerest thanks to the members of the committee, the many briefers who shared their reality of how strategy played out in their organizations, and the numerous talented professionals at the National Academies, including their IT support staff.
Tim Shepodd, Chair
Margaret E. Kosal, Vice Chair
Committee on Assessing and Improving
Strategies for Preventing, Countering,
and Responding to Weapons of Mass
Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats
