In April 1999 a group of 200 experts in the fields of infectious diseases, food safety, bioterrorism mitigation, and molecular medicine gathered for a colloquium at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. What brought this diverse group of individuals together was the understanding that each of their various disciplines must contend with certain “grand” problems that require enormous quantities of laboratory-based data to make progress. The various scientific challenges discussed during the meeting included (1) fighting deadly infectious diseases such as influenza A epidemics, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, and the human immunodeficiency virus; (2) ensuring safe food by reducing risks, detecting pathogens and toxins, and investigating infectious disease outbreaks; (3) mitigating bioterrorism and biowarfare by preventing attacks, characterizing agents, and minimizing aftermaths; and (4) facilitating work on human genetics and molecular medicine, especially in predicting cancers, diagnosing diseases, and tailoring medications.

Meeting participants identified the various needs in their disciplines as well as the accomplishments that would be possible if such needs were met with high-throughput laboratory and informatics resources. Participants emphasized problems involving large populations of people and/or significant numbers of genetic variations that, because of their sheer size, justify focused efforts to create and analyze enormous quantities of laboratory-based data. Within several years the associated databases are envisioned to grow to ~10¹⁵ bits (petabits); thus, the limiting factor is that humans, unaided, are not capable of producing such vast inventories of data.

Specialists surveyed the available building blocks for establishing petabit-generating user facilities—including robotics, laboratory automation, lab-on-a-chip, informatics, Internet, and process control innovations. They noted that, for the first time, all of the necessary pieces are available for building flexible and programmable laboratory firepower (a capability referred to as “mass customized testing via the Internet”). Although petabit-generating labs are available to medical and biological researchers in industry, they are not available to researchers in academic institutions. Such allocation of resources is currently shifting large-scale undertakings into the private sector and away from the public domain.

Policymakers noted that few, if any, government grants are available for intermediate-cost research efforts (e.g., user facilities), although grants are available for many small-cost (e.g., individual-investigator) and certain large-cost projects (e.g., human genome). Herein lies the most significant obstacle to obtaining adequate funding. User facilities that are dedicated to tackling grand problems will likely cost $20 million to start up over a 2-year period and $5 million to supply and operate annually. Yet no single government agency offers grants for such intermediate-cost research efforts, and frequently it is impossible to coordinate major funding across two or more agencies. Major philanthropic foundations may be a more realistic source of funds.

Meeting participants also discussed what approaches might be effective in surmounting such funding obstacles. One practical idea that gained wide support at the colloquium was that if researchers start with an especially compelling problem—such as a widespread and potentially catastrophic infectious disease—government agencies ultimately might be persuaded to offer much needed medium-level grants.

The chapters in this volume come from invited talks at the colloquium. They are arranged according to the four scientific challenges—infectious diseases, food safety, bioterrorism, and genomics—discussed during the meeting, with more detailed “technology” chapters interspersed between “scientific” chapters. The second chapter, “Tackling Grand Challenges with Powerful Technologies” offers an overview and perspective on the key topics in this volume. The last chapter, “Summary and Next Steps,” offers unofficial, yet important, conclusions and recommendations that emerged from the meeting.

We wish to thank the colloquium's sponsors for institutional and financial support: Association for Laboratory Automation; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Emergency Preparedness; Institute of Medicine; Los Alamos National Laboratory; National Academy of Engineering; and the University of California, Los Angeles. We also thank the members of the organizing committee for their help in

building the program: Donald S. Burke, Irvin S. Y. Chen, Raymond E. Dessy, Robin A. Felder, Maurice Hilleman, James M. Hughes, Gary W. Kramer, David J. Lipman, Michael Osterholm, William E. Paul, Robert T. Schooley, and Alejandro C. Zaffaroni. We especially thank Jonathan Davis and Andrew Pope at the Institute of Medicine for their interests and extra efforts. Finally, we acknowledge and thank Kathi E. Hanna for her expert editorial assistance in preparing this volume.

SCOTT P. LAYNE,

TONY J. BEUGELSDIJK, and

C. KUMAR N. PATEL, Editors

FIREPOWER IN THE LAB