7

Findings

During its discussions and information gathering activities in support of this report, the committee identified several findings on international talent programs. These are grouped into categories, as indicated below.

IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN STEM TALENT TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY AND COMPETITIVENESS

1. The science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce is of paramount importance to the United States given its direct role in fostering and sustaining innovation, economic competitiveness, and national security (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020; AAU and Business Roundtable, 2022; Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; JASON, 2019; NASEM, 2007b; NSB, 2024b).
2. The demand for STEM talent will continue to exceed the supply produced by the domestic STEM talent pipeline for the foreseeable future. Such shortfalls will be especially critical as they affect emerging technologies vital to continued technological leadership by the United States (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020; AAU and Business Roundtable, 2022; DeSilver, 2017; NASEM, 2007b, 2011, 2019a; NSB, 2015, 2024d; Olszewski et al., 2024; Reed, 2024).

3. Foreign STEM talent is a direct contributor to domestic innovation, economic growth, and leadership in science and technology as evidenced by the number of world-class researchers and entrepreneurs who come to the United States from other countries, either as international students or as direct entrants into the STEM workforce (JASON, 2019; NSB, 2022a, 2024d).
4. Foreign STEM talent also plays a role in expanding scientific and cultural perspectives and building international networks upon which future scientific collaborations and discoveries benefiting the nation will depend (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2021; NSB, 2024b; Wagner, 2024a).
5. As a result, it is imperative for the United States to continue to attract and retain the best and brightest foreign STEM talent at all levels in order to support its research enterprise, maintain its competitive advantage in technology development and innovation, and protect its economic and national security interests (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020; DHS, 2024b; U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 2020; U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2020b; NASEM, 2022b; NSB, 2022a).

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR HIGHLY SKILLED STEM TALENT

6. The market for STEM talent is competitive internationally, and the United States faces serious competition for top talent from both allied and potentially adversarial nations particularly in critical and emerging technology fields (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020; AAU and Business Roundtable, 2022; Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; JASON, 2019; NSB, 2024b; NSTC, 2024; U.S. Select Committee on the CCP, 2023; Wagner, 2024a; Zwetsloot, 2021).
7. Other nations realize the importance of international talent to economic growth, innovative capacity, and global leadership in the current, increasingly complex geopolitical environment. Some are implementing initiatives to attract and retain foreign students and scholars, including from the United States (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; JASON, 2019; NASEM, 2022b).
8. Despite many positive attributes, the United States’ leadership position with respect to attracting and retaining talent is vulnerable.

8. The United States can no longer take for granted that it will remain the destination of choice for the world’s best and brightest students, scholars, and professionals (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020; Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; JASON, 2019; U.S. Select Committee on the CCP 2023; NSB, 2024b).

FOREIGN TALENT PROGRAMS

9. As part of their efforts to recruit and retain international STEM talent, other nations have implemented intentional talent recruitment programs at the national level and below. These include incentivizing their citizens trained in other countries to return, effectively activating diaspora talent (Grove, 2024; NASEM, 2022b; Zweig, 2024).
10. Many competitor nations have immigration systems and schemes that are more flexible and more focused on particular skills than current U.S. immigration policies and that offer predictable pathways to permanent residency or citizenship (Kerr, 2018; NASEM, 2022b; Neufeld and Kaushik, 2024; Rovito et al., 2021).
11. Many competitor nations convey strong messaging that STEM talent recruitment is a priority and that STEM talent is welcome (OECD, 2019).
12. Attributes of talent recruitment and incentive programs effectively employed by other countries include the following (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; Zweig, 2024):
    1. Personal remuneration (salary, housing/living stipend)
    2. Research resources (research funding, advanced facilities, lab space, personnel including professional staff, postdocs, graduate students, and lab assistants)
    3. Access to capital for technology transfer and commercialization
    4. Facile pathways for individuals and immediate family members to stay in country long-term
13. Other nations, including China, have used talent recruitment programs to accelerate the acquisition of technology, intellectual property, and human resources. Characteristics and practices of some talent recruitment programs do not align with the values of the U.S. research enterprise including openness, transparency, and integrity, and have therefore been identified as “malign” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019; Diamond and Schell, 2018;

13. DOS, 2020; JASON, 2019, 2024; NASEM, 2017b; Prabhakar, 2024b; U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 2020; U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2020b; U.S. Select Committee on the CCP, 2023).

TALENT DEVELOPMENT, RECRUITMENT, AND RETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES

14. The United States does not currently have a whole-of-government STEM talent strategy or significant coordination of existing efforts across federal agencies. The United States has focused its efforts in the past on cultivating and maintaining an attractive research enterprise rather than creating formal talent recruitment programs (AAU and Business Roundtable, 2022; Merisotis, 2015; Smith et al., 2019; U.S. Select Committee on the CCP, 2023).
15. Foreign STEM talent is attracted to the United States by its strongly held democratic values; emphasis on openness, transparency, and integrity; abundant opportunities; and intellectual freedom to pursue promising ideas. Furthermore, the United States is attractive because of its leading research universities, cutting-edge scientific infrastructure, and vibrant technology sector. Strong, sustained support of the research enterprise and the talent that drives it is critical in the face of increasing international competition for talent (DOS, 2020; JASON, 2019; NASEM, 2022b).
16. The United States is missing opportunities to develop domestic STEM talent at all points along the educational and career pipeline, from K–12 through advanced degrees. This includes making more progress in bringing students from underrepresented and disadvantaged communities into STEM (Merisotis, 2015; NSB, 2024d).
17. The U.S. government sponsors programs through federal science agencies that provide direct fellowship funding for undergraduate students, graduate students, and postdoctoral researchers. Many of these incentive programs require U.S. citizenship or permanent residency. A much larger share of the investment in STEM talent development, both foreign and domestic, occurs via institutions of higher education utilizing both institutional funds and externally supported research projects and training programs, including those funded by the federal government (Savage, 2024b).

18. The United States lacks intentional efforts to ensure that foreign STEM talent, particularly individuals educated or trained in the United States, is able to remain, work, and contribute here. While the United States historically has been successful in attracting international talent, it is increasingly challenged in retaining such talent and faces growing competition for talent from both allies and potential adversaries (NASEM, 2022b).
19. Taking action to reduce the barriers to entry for students and professionals in STEM fields, along with barriers to remain and build their careers, is in the national interest of the United States (NSB, 2024d).
20. The increasing challenge of sustaining a workforce of advanced STEM degree holders requiring security clearances to conduct research and development activities for the Department of Defense and other agencies is exacerbated when the pipeline for international STEM talent is restricted at the stage of permanent residency (Nice, 2024).
21. U.S. immigration laws affecting foreign STEM talent primarily consist of provisions for temporary work or study, with limited options for permanent residency that are difficult, frustrating, and unwieldy to navigate. Furthermore, current rules and requirements regarding “nonimmigrant intent” for receiving a visa are counterproductive and incompatible with U.S. STEM talent recruitment goals (Neufeld and Kaushik, 2024).
22. While several recent presidential administrations from both political parties have sought to affect and adjust high-skilled immigration and visa policy through Executive Orders and other levers, Congress is the main driver of change for STEM immigration. Several recent attempts at immigration reform have failed to advance through Congress (NASEM, 2015).
23. U.S. government data on international talent, including STEM immigration and visas, are difficult to obtain online, split between different databases, and sometimes incomplete (Neufeld and Kaushik, 2024).
24. The U.S. Department of Justice’s China Initiative resulted in lingering, chilling effects on attracting and retaining Chinese-origin STEM talent because of a fear of and actual harassment and intimidation. Such chilling effects extend to other vulnerable groups, including both foreign and domestic students and

24. professionals, and result in the loss of talent from the United States, avoidance by researchers of some fields of inquiry and the pursuit of federal funding, and reduction of international collaborations (American Physical Society, 2021; Conroy, 2024; Flynn et al., 2024; Jia et al., 2024; OECD, n.d.b; Redden, 2021; Widener, 2021; Xie et al., 2023).

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

25. Foreign students, open research environments, and international research collaborations and partnerships present both opportunities and risks. While such risks can and should be mitigated, completely eliminating them would require drastic steps that would ultimately overtake the benefits and be detrimental to U.S. economic vitality, national security, and innovation. The benefits of welcoming international students to the United States, maintaining an open research environment, and engaging in international research collaborations and partnerships far outweigh the costs and risks of not doing so and are critical to a high-performing, innovative, and productive research ecosystem, and to U.S. leadership in science and technology (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2020, 2021; JASON, 2019, 2024; NASEM, 2022b).
26. International collaborations are firmly woven into the U.S. research enterprise, spanning sectors from academia to industry. From 2013 to 2022, 40 percent of journal articles with U.S.-based authors included one or more coauthors from a foreign institution. Furthermore, international collaborations are vital to tackling problems of global importance (Adams et al., 2023; American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2021; NSB, 2024b).
27. The U.S. government has formally defined “malign foreign talent recruitment programs” and is implementing training, monitoring, and reporting policies regarding international collaborations and talent programs (Prabhakar, 2024a; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 2024).
28. Key participants in the U.S. research enterprise, including academia, government, and industry, have seen a significant increase in the number and complexity of research security-related policies. While created with good intention, these policies increase administrative burden and cost and, in some cases, reinforce

28. fear, confusion, and existing inequities (JASON, 2024; NASEM, 2022b).
29. Research security-related policies that do not balance risks, benefits, and administrative burdens can impede the “exchange of ideas, participation by other researchers, and international collaboration, slowing the pace of research and making research environments less attractive to talented people.” Furthermore, the perception of increased risk and burdens associated with international collaborations may discourage researchers from engaging in these important activities (JASON, 2024; NASEM, 2022b; Prabhakar, 2024a).