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¹ “Countries of concern” to the United States are fluid, and the three countries presented in this chapter are considered countries of concern as of August 2024. Additional information on countries of concern can be found in Box 3-1.

² This section incorporates material from the commissioned paper “China’s Talent Programs: Lessons for the U.S.?” by David Zweig.

³ The committee wants to state upfront that when referring to China, this report is referring to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the State, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and not to its people, many of whom are invaluable contributors to the global scientific enterprise (Maizland and Albert, 2022; NASEM, 2023b). The CCP has more than 98 million members as of 2022, while China’s total population is more than 1.4 billion people (World Bank, 2023; Xinhua News Agency, 2003).

in China (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997; Meyer et al., 1997). This knowledge transfer could be made to and through universities, development zones, foreign and domestically run research institutes, global Chinese companies, state-owned enterprises, and the People’s Liberation Army (Fedasiuk and Feldgoise, 2020; Zweig, 2024).

Today, China operates 8 to 10 leading talent programs, but there may be up to several hundred similar efforts if provincial and municipal government talent programs are included (Hannas et al., 2013; Joske, 2020; Lloyd-Damnjanovic and Bowe, 2020; U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019b; Wang and Bao, 2015; Weinstein, n.d.). Appendix C provides a nonexhaustive listing of incentive programs used by China, as well as other nations, to recruit talent at the national and provincial levels.

National-Level Talent Programs

Some programs pre-date the CAS’s 100 Talents Plan. For example, beginning in 1987, Chinese ministries and funding organizations introduced incentives to attract researchers educated abroad back to China. That year, the former State Education Commission, now the Ministry of Education (MOE), established the Financial Support for Outstanding Young Professors Programme, which awarded 2,218 returning professors a total of 144 million yuan ($20.1 million USD in 2024) by the end of 2003 (Zweig, 2006).⁴ Other early programs included the Seed Fund for Returned Overseas Scholars (1990) and the Cross-Century Outstanding Personnel Training Programme (1991) (Zweig, 2006). The status of these programs is now unavailable (Weinstein, 2020). See Table 6-1 for a list of PRC national-level talent programs.

The Spring Light Program, which brought Chinese researchers educated abroad back to visit China following the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in 1989, became MOE policy in 1996. The China Overseas Students Services Center (Zhongguo liuxue fuwu zhongxin), a unit under the MOE, eventually turned this program into a competition called the Chunhui Cup (Chunhui bei) (China Overseas Network, 2007; Spear, 2021). Working with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the program arranged meetings between short-term returnees or visitors

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⁴ USD calculated using an exchange rate of 1 USD = 7.156 RMB as of August 6, 2024. See https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=CNY.

and officials and business organizations at special fairs throughout China. The Chunhui Cup competition aims to stimulate student innovation and entrepreneurship around the globe. In 2019, the program shortlisted 301 projects, mostly from the United States (80), the United Kingdom (42), Australia (28), Canada (24), France (16), Japan (14), Germany (13), Singapore (10) and Switzerland (10), focusing largely on automation, new materials, new energy, and biotechnology. From 2006 to 2018, 2,528 projects were shortlisted, of which 17 percent relocated to China (Hannas and Tatlow, 2021). By 2023, 3,424 projects had been selected (Global Business College of Australia, 2022).

The Chinese government and the CCP established and expanded part-time programs for overseas scholars once it became apparent that these would be more attractive than full-time programs. While the Changjiang Scholars Program included a part-time component at the outset, MOE expanded the number of part-time awardees when few people committed to join full-time. China initially believed the CCP’s mobilization skills would ensure the Thousand Talent Program’s (TTP) success,⁵ even with only a full-time component. However, from a sample of 501 of the first 1,500 participants in the program, 73.5 percent of these individuals were participating in a part-time capacity (Zweig and Wang, 2013; Zweig et al., 2020).

Part-time talent programs proved to be much more problematic for the U.S. government than full-time talent programs (Zweig and Kang, 2020). If someone studies in the United States and then returns to China, the knowledge transfer is a one-time event. But knowledge and technology transfer can occur on a regular basis under a part-time program, where the talent program participant is moving back and forth and perhaps setting up a laboratory in China that mirrors their U.S. research lab. A selection of major talent programs run by the Chinese government as of 2018 are presented in Table 6-1.

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⁵ Stoff writes that “[t]he Changjiang Scholars, Hundred Talents, and Thousand Talents programs have had notable success recruiting world-class experts who have made significant contributions to China’s S&T development” and that “[t]hese talent programs were foundational to a monumental policy shift that recognized that human capital investment was key to China’s S&T development” (Stoff, 2021). A recent report by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) notes that “China is becoming more successful at attracting foreign talent but is still far from competing effectively with other global talent hubs,” including the United States (Groenewegen-Lau and Hmaidi, 2024). Shi et al. find that Young Thousand Talent program participants are “associated with a postreturn publication gain across journal-quality tiers,” likely attributable to access to more research funding and larger research teams (Shi et al., 2023).

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⁶ Researchers at the Moffitt Cancer Research Institute in Tampa, Florida and Charles Lieber at Harvard University, who were found guilty of concealing their respective affiliations with the TTP, participated in the Overseas High-Level Experts program.

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⁷ These data were accessed by David Zweig at http://www.1000plan.org.cn/qrjh/section/4/list on October 4, 2019, and are no longer available online.

⁸ The Chinese Talent Program Tracker created and maintained by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) classifies Chinese talent programs as “active,” “inactive,” or “absorbed” and provides additional information on Chinese talent programs that may have been renamed or subsumed by another program when available. See https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/.

earlier compilations of talent programs. However, the committee notes that the U.S. Department of Defense has stopped updating lists of PRC talent programs because of the frequent changes to the names of these programs.

From their earliest stages, the principal focus of PRC talent programs has been on Chinese nationals and on the global Chinese diaspora as sources of talent and technology (Xie and Freeman, 2020; Zweig et al., 2008). For example, in early 2007, the MOE put forth a plan to “strengthen the work of attracting excellent talent from overseas” (PRC Ministry of Education, 2007). This program defined three types of talents: international leaders in their fields who have created innovative teams, “Sturdy” (jieshi) basic researchers capable of making breakthroughs and becoming top academic leaders, and “Core” (zhugan) young professors and researchers who can raise the entire level of research and teaching (Zweig and Wang, 2013).

To find such individuals, the MOE called on local governments to create databases listing their needs related to talent in education, research, and innovation and to work those gaps into each locality’s development strategy. Then, after building a citywide database of their needs, they were to introduce new policies that would facilitate the return of talent (Beijing Municipal Government, 2000; van Dongen, 2022). Education counselors in Chinese embassies and consulates abroad were also expected to build datasets of PRC-born Chinese talent in their locality, find out who among them was “inclined to return,” strengthen links with these people, and then make concrete plans to bring them home (Zhao and Zhu, 2017; Zweig et al., 2021; Zweig and Wang, 2013). An online newspaper known as Shenzhou Xueren would be used by the MOE to spread the message about overseas study (Broaded, 1993; Zweig, 2006). Various local and overseas returnee organizations were to bridge the population overseas, while the domestic units needing returnees were to meet with groups of overseas scholars whom the ministry would bring back biannually using programs, such as CAS’s 100 Talents Program, the Changjiang Scholars Program, and the Spring Light Program (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2007; Li et al., 2015; Wang and Bao, 2015).

However, China recognized at the time that its universities remained insufficient to fulfill the goals the MOE established. Instead, China needed “new ways of thinking” (xin silu) and “new methods” for bringing back overseas talent (Zweig and Wang, 2013). After Li Yuanchao became director of the CCP Organization Department following the 17th Party Congress

in 2007, he proposed the Overseas High-Level Talent Recruitment Programs policy (Haiwai gaocengci rencai yinjin jihua), or the 1000 Talents Plan, and began a nationwide mobilization to get people to return to China (Bekkers, 2017; Zweig and Kang, 2020). Li was convinced that with Communist Party leadership the sluggish pace of reverse migration could be sped up dramatically and people would return full-time unlike under the Changjiang Scholars Program. Under his leadership, the CCP moved into action, following many of the strategies articulated in the MOE’s plan of 2007.

Under a nationwide mobilization, cities established talent committees under the city’s CCP committees to promote the program, which were expected to create lists of the extant gaps in their talent bases (General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2012). Cities throughout China were pressured to commit publicly to a target number of highly talented returnees they would recruit (China Economic Net, 2010; Zweig and Wang, 2013). Beijing promised to deliver 500 new talents from abroad within a 5-year period, while Guangzhou promised to bring home 300 China-born scientists, academics, and businesspeople who were living abroad. Jinan, an inland city home to Shandong University, committed to attracting 150 returnees, a number beyond its capabilities. With the policy under the local CCP committee, pressure to meet commitments increased, though the quotas of returnees to which cities had committed was reportedly “soft” and would not affect people’s careers if they were not accomplished (Zweig, 2024).

However, expectations were high for employers, including universities, high-tech parks, research institutes, and state-owned enterprises, that were expected to improve their internal environments so returnees would stay. In December 2009, Shanghai sought to recruit 115 financial sector employees presently located in New York, Toronto, and Singapore to return, a task made easier by the global financial crisis (Zweig and Kang, 2020; Zweig and Wang, 2013). The salary package offered to these individuals was reportedly competitive with overseas salaries, while the city government promised to resolve all housing, education, and health care issues (CCTV, 2009; Dawson, 2010). Similarly, officials from Jinan sought to recruit 150 individuals in 5 years under the capital city’s “5-150 jobs campaign,” carrying out recruiting visits in New York, Silicon Valley, and Toronto (China Economic Net, 2010; Zweig and Kang, 2020; Zweig and Wang, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the most effective

recruiting was through personal ties rather than publicity or outreach (Li et al., 2015; Peng, 2023).⁹

No policy in China can escape having a propaganda component (Chang, 2021; Diamond and Schell, 2019). As mentioned earlier, an online newspaper known as Shenzhou Xueren was established by the MOE in 1994 explicitly to network with PRC-born Chinese people living overseas (Broaded, 1993; Zweig, 2006). Besides websites for each of these programs, and for universities and governments who created their own talent programs, this website kept Chinese people overseas abreast of options available for those contemplating returning. The Overseas Edition of the People’s Daily, which reflects CCP policy, published a series of articles over several months commending returnees. Furthermore, the state held conferences to “glorify” those who had returned, with major “laudatory activities” (biaoyang huodong) occurring in 1991, 1997, and 2003 (Miao, 2010). The CCP emphasized this type of activity and encouraged competition among government agencies and knowledge-based institutes in establishing contacts with PRC-born scholars working overseas (Biao, 2005). The CCP endowed recipients of the TTP, in particular, with a great deal of prestige. While Changjiang Scholars Program participants were not held in the same esteem as the TTP winners, this designation did help recipients to stand out among their peers (Jiang, 2018; Li et al., 2015; Li and Tang, 2022).

To further reduce “transaction costs,” the central government introduced a new “R” visa category especially for high-end foreign talents whose professions and employers are among the lists provided by the central and local governments in September 2013 (Qian and Elsinga, 2015; Yin, 2013; Yu and Wang, 2018). According to this policy, R visa holders are eligible for a 5-year residence permit without any additional requirements (Xin, 2013). The “R” visa category was expanded in 2017 to include “scientists, entrepreneurs, and leading experts in science and technology industries” (Zwetsloot, 2020).

As noted in Chapter 2 of this report, in the years following Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2012, Chinese talent recruitment programs were

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⁹ A recent report by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) notes that “China has not been very successful in attracting high-quality talent who didn’t already have an established link to China” (Groenewegen-Lau and Hmaidi, 2024). Establishing personal connections is of paramount importance and often factors into recruitment decisions (Jia, 2018). Furthermore, the committee notes China’s use of LinkedIn, a social media platform for networking, to recruit assets abroad (Tucker, 2020; U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2022; Wong, 2019).

reinvented as a lever to “facilitate the transfer of technology” and to cultivate human capital (Lester et al., 2022; Priestap, 2018; Zwetsloot, 2020). In 2015, Xi proclaimed that “overseas Chinese students are an important component of the ranks of talent” (rencai duiwu) and are “also a new focal point of United Front work” (ye shi tongzhan gongzuo xin de zhaolidian) (Xi, 2015). This suggested that the CCP would increase its control of activities related to overseas students and scholars and would actively engage Chinese-born individuals in other countries, possibly through embassies and consulates (Xi, 2015). After decades of handling ties with the Chinese diaspora, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was assimilated into the United Work Front Department¹⁰ following CCP and government reforms in 2018 (Joske, 2019; People’s Republic of China, 2018).

It has been stated that the original intent of the TTP was to “create an ‘innovative society,’ not to steal U.S. technology” (Zweig and Kang, 2020). In the 2010s, however, Chinese talent recruitment programs and similar initiatives began to be seen as problematic by the United States and Australia (Joske, 2018; Mervis, 2019a; Redden, 2019; Vogel and Ouagrham-Gormley, 2023).¹¹ U.S. government agencies took notice, with the FBI releasing the report Higher Education and National Security: The Targeting of Sensitive, Proprietary and Classified Information on Campuses of Higher Education in April 2011¹² and a Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note (SPIN) on Chinese talent programs in September 2015 (FBI, 2011, 2015). The National Institutes of Health (NIH) became aware of undue foreign interference in NIH-funded research in 2016 (NIH, 2024a). The National Science Foundation (NSF) issued a requirement that

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¹⁰ The United Front Work Department (UFWD) reports directly to the CCP Central Committee (Fedasiuk, 2020; Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Joske, 2020b; NASEM, 2023b). The UFWD is the agency responsible for coordinating the CCP’s “United Front” work, which “mostly focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China, but … also has an important foreign influence mission” (Bowe, 2018).

¹¹ Vogel and Ouagrham-Gormley write that “U.S. officials’ view of the TTP started to change under the Donald Trump administration, which reversed position and took a more aggressive policy stance toward China, rooting the TTP in the ongoing fight about China’s infringement on intellectual property rights” (Vogel and Ouagrham-Gormley, 2023).

¹² Furthermore, the report China’s Program for Science and Technology Modernization: Implications for American Competitiveness was prepared by CENTRA Technology, Inc. and delivered to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2011. See https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_REPORT_China%27s_Program_forScience_and_Technology_Modernization.pdf.

all onsite rotators¹³ must be U.S. citizens or have applied for U.S. citizenship in April 2018, and it was reported in March 2019 that the agency was in negotiations with the JASON independent science advisory group to commission a report on the “growing concerns that international [scientific] collaborations pose a security risk to the United States” (Córdova, 2019; Mervis, 2019b). The commissioning of the JASON report was formally announced by National Science Foundation (NSF) Director France Córdova in July 2019, and the resulting product, Fundamental Research Security, was released in December 2019 (Córdova, 2019; NSF, 2019).¹⁴

In January 2019, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued a policy on foreign government talent recruitment programs, stating that “DOE personnel will be subject to limitations, including prohibitions on their ability currently or in the future to participate in foreign talent recruitment programs of countries determined sensitive by DOE while employed by DOE, or performing work within the scope of a DOE contract” (Brouillette, 2019; Mervis and Cho, 2019; Puko and O’Keeffe, 2019a; Redden, 2019). DOE Order 486.1, issued in June 2019, prohibited DOE federal and contractor employees “from participating in certain foreign government talent recruitment programs” (DOE, 2019; Puko and O’Keeffe, 2019b). While the order did not list specific countries, it was reported that DOE officials were limiting participation in such programs sponsored by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia (Thomas, 2019).

Meanwhile, in March 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) stated the need to work with institutions of higher education performing defense research “to limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit United States technology within the Department of Defense research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise” in accordance with the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note; P.L. 115-232) (Griffin, 2019a). This was followed by a letter from Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin to the academic community in October 2019, in which he asked for “help in developing and implementing solutions and best practices [for research protection] and participating in threat awareness and information sharing” (Griffin, 2019b).

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¹³ At NSF, rotators are visiting scientists, engineers, and educators who serve as temporary program directors, typically for 1 to 2 years. See https://new.nsf.gov/careers/rotator-programs.

¹⁴ NSF has subsequently commissioned additional reports on the topic of research security from the JASON independent scientific advisory group.

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¹⁵ The top 100 universities in the world as defined by three different ranking systems: (1) Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), (2) Times Higher Education (THE), and (3) Quacquarelli Symonds (QS).

¹⁶ USD calculated using an exchange rate of 1 USD = 85.5736 RUB as of August 6, 2024. See https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=RUB&To=USD.

Project 5-100, which required each university “to have at least 10 percent international professors amongst the staff and no less than 15 percent international students” (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2015; Vorotnikov, 2021). More than 40 percent of all Ph.D. students in Russia studied at these 21 universities (Maloshonok and Terentev, 2019; Tsvetkova, 2024).

The successor excellence initiative to Project 5-100 is the Priority 2030 Strategic Academic Leadership Program (Priority 2030) (ACA, 2021; Kochetkov, 2022; Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 2021a; Tsvetkova, 2024; Vorotnikov, 2021). This program, which is the “largest scale state program in Russian history designed to support Russian universities and drive the competitive quality of Russian education, science and technology” through the creation of more than 100 progressive modern universities in Russia, was launched by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education on June 24, 2021, and will operate until 2030 (Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 2021b; TYCYP, n.d., 2022; Vorotnikov, 2021).¹⁷ The Russian Ministry of Education and Science will provide at least 100 billion rubles ($1.17 billion USD in 2024)¹⁸ in funding for the program, with 106 universities selected to participate and receive a basic grant of 100 million rubles per year ($1.17 million USD in 2024) (Kochetkov, 2022; Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 2021b; Vorotnikov, 2021). The award “may be spent on propitious research and developments, or projects aimed at solving the region’s tasks” (Priority 2030, n.d.). Forty-six universities were later selected to receive additional grant funding to focus on research leadership or territorial/industry leadership (Kochetkov, 2022).

The Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) is a Russian graduate university established in 2011 in partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Skoltech was founded to be one of the best science and technology universities in Russia, and its partnership with MIT was essential to its success (Box 6-1). MIT severed its partnership with Skoltech following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The ITMO (Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics) Fellowship Program was established in 2014 with the goal of strengthening ITMO University “as a research hub through international academic mobility and

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¹⁷ Some information regarding the Priority 2030 program has been removed from the internet and is no longer accessible (Tsvetkova, 2024).

¹⁸ USD calculated using an exchange rate of 1 USD = 85.5736 RUB as of August 6, 2024. See https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=RUB&To=USD.

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¹⁹ ITMO University is a state-supported university and one of Russia’s National Research Universities. Its full name is the Saint Petersburg National Research University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics.

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²⁰ An h-index of 15.7 means the researchers in this program have published an average of 15.7 papers that have each been cited an average of 15.7 times.

²¹ In 2012, the NSF determined that 89 percent of Iranian doctoral degree recipients remained in the United States (Motevalli, 2014b).

²² Approximately 67,000 Iranian citizens departed the country in the 1970s, 281,000 departed the country in the 1980s, and 2.1 million departed the country in the 1990s (Financial Tribune, 2015; Leube, 2013). Azadi et al. estimate a cumulative total of 3.1 million Iranian-born people have emigrated from the country as of 2019 (Azadi et al., 2020). The outward flow continues, with Iran experiencing “the fastest growth in the migration rate to wealthy OECD countries between 2020 and 2021” (Ghaffari, 2023). Those leaving Iran cite economic, political, and environmental factors (Azadi et al., 2020; Esfandiari, 2024; Mahmoudi, 2021; Sinaiee, 2024; Ziabari, 2023).

using “their talents to encourage entrepreneurship and wealth creation in the country” (Iran Project, 2017).

The Iranian government also has promoted international education,²³ with the explicit goal of cultivating students who will return to Iran and share their innovative knowledge in country (DCSA, 2021). Finally, initiatives such as the “cooperation with Iranian expat entrepreneurs and elite plan” seek to attract Iranians abroad to share their knowledge, experience, and technology ideas (Tehran Times, 2018b).

THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

The committee notes that malign foreign talent recruitment programs are fluid and a moving target for several reasons. National-level programs are frequently restructured and rebranded in response to actions taken by the U.S. government (Weinstein, n.d.; Zhu et al., 2023). As presented in Appendix C, the PRC has many additional foreign talent recruitment programs at the provincial and local levels. The committee did not have access to talent program contracts signed by participants currently residing in or with ties to the United States beyond those that are publicly available.²⁴ According to Michael Lauer, deputy director for extramural research at the National Institutes of Health, talent program contracts obtained by the agency varied among different Chinese entities and programs, but typically included one or more of the characteristics of a malign foreign talent recruitment program.²⁵ It is reasonable to expect that these programs will continue to morph as the United States, and other allies, implement rules and regulations intended to prevent researchers receiving domestic funding from participating in such programs. For this reason, training and continuing information flows to institutions and

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²³ Azadi et al. estimate that approximately 700,000 Iranian-born individuals have studied at foreign universities, with numbers increasing since the early 2000s (Azadi et al., 2020). Approximately 130,000 Iranian-born students were enrolled at institutions abroad in the late 2010s (Azadi et al., 2020).

²⁴ Publicly available contracts include Appendix A of the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ report on Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. See https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20Appendix%20A%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf.

²⁵ A definition of “malign foreign talent recruitment program” can be found in the Glossary.

researchers about flags to watch for will be imperative.²⁶ Resources regarding problematic programs and institutions are likely to become obsolete almost as soon as they are promulgated.

The committee also notes that some nations not designated as countries of concern in Box 3-3 have engaged in practices that are defined as malign by provisions contained in the CHIPS and Science Act (P.L. 117-167, August 9, 2022). For example, some universities in Saudi Arabia offered lucrative payments for highly cited researchers to list their institution as a secondary affiliation, or to switch their primary affiliation to their institution, during the 2010s (Ansede, 2023; Bhattacharjee, 2011; Catanzaro, 2023a, 2023b). This was done with the intent of raising the rankings and prestige of Saudi institutions, rather than obtaining information or intellectual property.

Such examples demonstrate that, while some of the characteristics of malign talent programs have potentially direct economic and national security implications, others represent unethical shortcuts to improving competitiveness in the global attraction of talent. Students and researchers are attracted by outstanding universities and a robust S&T ecosystem. The quality of its higher education system and of its research universities in particular is a critical component of a nation’s attractiveness to international talent. While the United States boasts a wealth of research universities that is second to none, global competition is increasing. The Aggregate Ranking of Top Universities, or ARTU, which combines the three major global rankings (Times Higher Education World University Rankings, QS World University Rankings, and ShanghaiRanking’s Academic Rankings of World Universities) shows gains in the number of top 200 universities over the last decade in Australia, China, and Germany, largely at the expense of the United States. In fact, China now ranks third behind the United States and the United Kingdom in the number of its universities ranked in the top 200 (Jack, 2023; Morrison, 2023; Shanghai Ranking, 2023; Simon, 2023; Times Higher Education, 2024; QS World University Rankings, 2024; UNSW, 2024; Wagner, 2024b). Furthermore, China reiterated its commitment to building “world-class universities” in support of achieving its ambitious S&T goals in July 2024 (Wang, 2024).

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²⁶ The NSF, in partnership with the National Institutes of Health, DOE, and DOD, released four research security training modules in January 2024. In accordance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 and the CHIPS and Science Act, “covered individuals (senior/key personnel) listed on the application for a research and development award are required to take the training.” See https://new.nsf.gov/research-security/training.

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²⁷ The Belt and Road Initiative is a Chinese development effort with over $1 trillion USD in Chinese investment, with the objective of building influence through connecting infrastructure projects across more than 70 locations, including Mongolia, Russia, Eurasian countries, Central and West Africa, Pakistan, Indian subcontinent countries, and Indochina (McBride et al., 2023; OECD, 2018; Russel and Berger, 2019; State Council Information Office, 2023).

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